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A Machine-Learned Model To Detect Malicious Code
Using API-call N-grams From Static Analysis

Abstract:
A technique to improve computer security is to test an executable for the presence of
malicious code without running the executable. This publication describes systems and techniques
for machine learning on application-programming-interface-call (API-call) n-grams from static
analysis to automatically determine whether an executable or shared library binary file includes
indicators of malicious code. The systems and techniques generate API-call graphs from the file.
From the API-call graphs, the systems and techniques generate n-grams. A machine-learned
model, using the n-grams, then identifies malicious code or code that performs unwanted behavior.
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Background:
A technique, which is referred to as static analysis, to improve computer security is to test
an executable or shared library binary file for the presence of malicious code without running the
executable. Examples of malicious code include attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities in an
operating system. Many techniques generally do not scale well for analyzing a large number of
files in a software package (e.g., an operating system). These techniques may also not keep up
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well with a constantly changing landscape of malicious and unwanted software. Therefore,
systems and techniques that can automatically determine whether an executable or shared library
binary file includes indicators of malicious code or code that performs unwanted behavior, which
is referred to as “potentially harmful code” in this document, is needed.

Description:
This publication describes systems and techniques to implement a machine-learned model
on API-call n-grams from static analysis of a binary file for the detection of malicious code or code
that performs unwanted behavior. A machine-learned algorithm detects potentially harmful code
by generating API-call graphs from binary files of an executable file or a shared library binary file,
computing n-grams from the API-call graphs, and using the n-grams to train a machine-learned
model to identify and detect potentially harmful code. Figure 1 illustrates this process.

Figure 1
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Generate API-call graphs
Figure 2 illustrates a method of generating an API-call graph of a binary file of an
executable or shared library given a control-flow graph (CFG) of the executable file.

Figure 2

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020

4

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 3590 [2020]

The method illustrated in Figure 2 computes the condensation of the CFG (202) to convert
mutually-recursive functions into single-graph nodes, resulting in a directed acyclic graph. Each
node in the directed acyclic graph has a unique identifier. The condensation is then topologically
sorted (204). Within each recursive-function group, the method tracks completed functions. A
function is complete when all the functions in the recursive-function group are complete. The
topological sort assures that calls to upstream functions (which are incomplete) are not
encountered, while downstream functions are complete. Thus, only functions within the current
node are potentially incomplete but callable.
The nodes of the condensation are iterated through, starting with the most downstream
nodes (206). The method creates a new recursive-function group for a node (208) and populates
it with new entry nodes and exit nodes for each function therein. For each function, a subgraph is
created (210) for each of its basic blocks, linking them with epsilon transitions based on the control
flow. In this context, an epsilon (ε) transition is a no-operations transition, which, in automata
theory, is one that occurs without consuming an input symbol). Within a basic block, the control
flow is sequential.
Instructions within the basic blocks are translated to transitions as follows:
1.

Convert instructions to ε transitions or omit them altogether;

2.

Map an assembly-level API-call instruction to the corresponding system call;

3.

Map a function call through a procedure-linkage table to an API-call based on the
name of the imported function;

4.

Map a function-call instruction to the subgraph corresponding to its target as
follows:
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a.

If the function is in the current recursive group, add an ε transition to the
entry node and from the exit node.

b.

Otherwise, treat the called function as if it were inlined by making a copy
of its recursive-function group in the current recursive-function group. The
copy is linked-in with an ε transition added to the entry node and from the
exit node.

When the functions in the node are processed, the method adds them to the function mapping of
recursive-function groups (212). The method then increments the node-id to the immediatelyupstream node (214), and, if nodes are left (216), iterates through the remaining nodes.
In this context, an upstream node corresponds to a node that is not downstream. For
example, consider a graph with node a that has two child-nodes b and c, resulting in a topological
sort [a, b, c]. A movement from node c to node b is considered an upstream movement,
even though nodes b and c are siblings in the graph-theoretic sense.
When the nodes of the condensation are exhausted, an API-call graph is created (218) for
the output. The method moves each recursive-function group into the API-call graph by moving
the transitions and adding each of the function start nodes to the entry points of the graph. As a
result of the condensation, a function can only call other functions that are either within the same
node or in downstream nodes. In this way, functions can have their CFGs inlined into upstream
callers, which effectively provides return-address tracing and produces a more-accurate CFG. By
keeping track of node identifiers within recursive-function groups, the method can efficiently
assign new node identifiers with a single update pass over the transitions.
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Compute n-grams from the API-call graphs
The systems and techniques then compute n-grams from the generated API-call graph(s).
N-grams are used in document processing to summarize the content of a document as a set of text
fragments. The generated API-call graphs have document-like content, which is referred to in this
document as a grammar. Given a loop in an executable, a grammar can represent a set of execution
traces with an arbitrary number of iterations of the loop. The grammar is generally limited to a
finite number of n-grams of a given length—at most SN, where S is the number of symbols in the
grammar and N is the length of n-grams. An artificial intelligence (AI) integrator uses the
following algorithm to extract n-grams from the API-call graphs contained in the executable file.
The AI integrator uses a recursive algorithm to annotate each node of an API-call graph
with its incoming n-grams using dynamic programming and n-graph traversals. The algorithm
merges strongly-ε-connected components to make an ε-subgraph acyclic. The nodes of the εsubgraph are sorted topologically and inverted to obtain a map from a node to its non-ε
predecessors (e.g., the source node and API call). For the recursive base case (e.g., if n = 0), the
algorithm annotates each node with a set containing the empty 0-gram. Otherwise, the algorithm
annotates each node with its incoming (n-1)-grams. The algorithm then annotates each source
node and destination node with an array of n-grams, including non-ε predecessors and ε successors.
The extracted n-grams are then aggregated per file. An extractor can then output the n-grams
directly or as a set of string features in a word form.

Build, using the n-grams, a machine-learned model
String features can be collected and categorized with corresponding potentially harmful
code to train a machine-learning model. After sufficient training, the machine-learning model can

https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3590

7

Boulgakov and Ren: A Machine-Learned Model To Detect Malicious Code Using API-call N

be deployed to the computer readable medium of a computer system as a machine-learned model.
The computer system can use the machine-learned model to recognize potentially-harmful
executables. Instead of focusing only on signatures associated with known malicious code, the
machine-learned model can target exploits and known vulnerabilities generally to identify
potentially-harmful executables.
In this way, the described systems and techniques use machine learning on API-call ngrams to identify malicious and potentially-harmful executables.
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